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Court Control Over Treatment
of Juvenile Offenders
Thomas M. Cooley H*
The thesis of this paper can be stated simply: to the extent that
courts permit procedural (or substantive)' treatment of juveniles which
varies from and falls below the constitutional protections which adults
may command, and that variance is predicated upon the power of the
State to substitute rehabilitation for punishment in dealing with the
young, then, and to the same extent, the courts have the duty of seeing
to it that the treatment afforded is in fact rehabilitative and not punitive
in nature and effect. Otherwise, the courts must face the criticism that:
It is not only illogical but blatantly inconsistent with the fair treat-
ment of the child to argue, on the one hand, that the safeguards
of criminal procedure are unnecessary in non criminal cases and
then, on the other hand, to apply criminal sanctions in such cases.
2
Before coming to what the writer sees as a basic conflict between
the pretext of rehabilitation and the fact of penalty which has been
largely concealed by the rhetoric surrounding the juvenile courts, 3
it will be well to locate and to limit the area of discussion planned.
It is not intended to review again the impact of Kent4 and Gault5 or
Winship.6 One is tempted to accept the view that more has already
been said about them than there was to say.7 At least the first two have
engendered a literature so prolific and profound as to make temerarious
* A.B., University of Michigan; LL.B., Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh, School of Law.
1. Children are quite generally forbidden activities open to adults. Among these
appear truancy, resistance to parental control, frequenting places of adult entertainment
and a heterogeneous list of habits which have at one time or another appealed to legisla-
tures as being bad for the young or, concomitantly, calling for rehabilitation. A detailed,
and sometime incongruous, outline of such provisions is compactly set out in SussMAN,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1959). Portions, but by no means all, of this outline have been
eliminated in the legislative revisions of the years since its publication.
2. Delinquent Children in Penal Institutions U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and
Welfare, CHILDPEN's BuRA.u PUBLICATION #415 at 10 (1964).
3. See Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?
57 GEO. L.J. 848 (1968).
4. Kent v. United States; 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See, Cohill article supra at 577.




any effort to expand or improve on it.8 Nevertheless, present-day con-
sideration of any part of the juvenile law field cannot proceed without
taking bearings on the landmarks the United States Supreme Court has
provided.
The flat assumption is made throughout these remarks that accused
juveniles are entitled to the protection of those basic rules of fairness
which underlie the criminal due process safeguards afforded adults.
This assumption rests not only on what the Supreme Court has ex-
pressly made authoritative but also on a consideration which, if it has
been at all influential, has remained largely unexpressed.9 That is the
conviction that if the purpose of dealing with juveniles is wholly, or
even partly, to effect their rehabilitation, it is absolutely essential that
they be, and that they realize they are, fairly treated in the process of
determining whether the accusations against them are proven true.
A considerable degree of sophistication on the part of today's youth
must be taken for granted. If they know or suspect that they are
handled and "convicted"'1 in ways which would nullify a similar pro-
ceding against their elders,"! it seems beyond question that their
empathy or cooperation with subsequent rehabilitative programs and
efforts will be minimal-as will beneficial results. 12
It would be disingenuous to pretend that this assumption commands,
even today, uniform concurrence. Since its inception at the turn of the
century the juvenile court movement has based its very existence on
the benign proposition that something more and different must be ac-
corded juvenile offenders than subjecting them to the sordid and de-
grading atmosphere of our criminal courts and penal institutions. They
were to be helped and rehabilitated, not convicted and punished; and
in seeking this goal the State was acting as parens patriae, not prosecu-
tor. In the latter distinction was found the constitutional justification
8. Even a partial listing of this literature would extend greatly beyond present needs,
and a partial list will unjustly slight some excellent efforts. Broad coverage can be found,
however, in Dorsen and Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMILY
L.Q. 1 (1967); Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527 (1968);
George, Gault and the Juvenile Court Revolution, Inst. of Continuing Legal Education,
Ann Arbor (1968). This writer owes much to the student effort which foresaw many of
the basic issues later dealt with in Gault: Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State
Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966).
9. - But see, In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27 (1967).
10. It is doubtful that youngsters are mollified by the use of such euphemisms as
"found involved."
11. Who knows what they learn-rightly and wrongly-from the press, the movies,
Perry Mason and other television depictions of the goings-on in adult courts?
. 12. See,- Juienile Delinquency, Its Prevention and Control, Russel Sage Foundation
at 33 (1966); NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSION REPORT at 85 (1967).
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for relaxing or omitting altogether many formal safeguards which
Anglo-American criminal law had evolved.13 And it came to be ac-
cepted that there was somehow a congruence between eliminating legal
"technicalities" in juvenile proceedings and achieving rehabilitation.
Kent, Gault and now Winship are emphatic in saying that benefits are
nor conferred on juveniles by skimping the rules that have been evolved
to sift out the truth of accusations. Read at large, they are equally clear
in disclaiming any purpose to limit juvenile courts in the search for
dispositional methods which will aid in the rehabilitation of children
properly found deliquent.14
Nevertheless, a natural tendency to dwell on the Supreme Court's
evocations of the great principles of due process has tended to obscure
the fact that returning juveniles to parity with others who are entitled
to constitutional protection at a trial or hearing is only a beginning.
Once it is determined by meticulously correct procedure that a youth
has been involved in proscribed conduct, 5 what is to be done? How
"rehabilitate"?
It is not proposed here to explore, or even touch upon the enormous
problems of correction which have baffled sociologists, social workers,
criminologists and others over most of recorded time.' But it is sub-
mitted that each juvenile court has an unavoidable responsibility to
enquire whether there are, in its jurisdiction, facilities which reason-
ably purport to carry out the functions which justify its own existence.
Juvenile courts were created and set apart principally to provide a
means of ameliorating the problems of delinquency-of smoothing
the path to rehabilitation of delinquents. If they make no effort to
see that their determinations have at least a prospect of doing so, one
may question the legitimacy of their function.1 7
13. Almost every state has at least one case devoted to a painstaking exposition of
this theory. Gault itself refers to the seminal article on the subject by Judge Mack, The
Juvenile Court 27 H/Av. L. REv. 104 (1909), and to a major compilation of the.state
authorities, Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REVIEW 167. Two frequently quoted examples are Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah
473, 88 P. 609 (1907), and, from a more recent era, Holmes' Appeal 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d
523 (1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 973 (1955). The latter case evoked a telling dissent which
urged a distinction between the process of determining the fact of delinquent behaviour
and that of prescribing treatment, pointing out the grave consequences of finding de-
linquency by the use of loose procedures.
14. See e.g., "... . nothing will require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge
be replaced by its opposite . . ." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27 (1967).
15. There are, or should be, limits to what may be proscribed, although these remain
largely unexplored.
16. See, Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969); Hart, The Aims
of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958); Twerski, Treating the
Untreatable, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 218 (1971).
17. Of course, the burden of ensuring that efforts are made and facilities provided
615
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That question has been stated in stark terms: "it would be better
for all concerned if young delinquents were not detected, apprehended
or institutionalized. Too many of them get worse in our care.""8 It
has also been obliquely referred to by many courts in the process of dis-
cussing more familiar legal issues. Thus Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, in dissent to Winship said:
Much of the judicial attitude manifested by the Court's opinion
today and earlier holdings in this field is really a protest against
inadequate court staffs and facilities; we "burn down the stable
to get rid of the mice."'19
This may be read to imply that over-concern with constitutional niceties
in the determination of delinquency may inhibit the effectuation of
rehabilitatory effort.20 The same dissent says later:
My hope is that today's decision will not spell the end of a
generously conceived program of compassionate treatment in-
tended to mitigate the rigors and trauma of exposing youthful
offenders to a traditional criminal court; each step we take turns
the clock back to the pre-juvenile-court era. I cannot regard it as
a manifestation of progress to transform juvenile courts into crim-
inal courts, which is what we are well on the way to accomplishing.
We can only hope the legislative response will not reflect our
own by having these courts abolished.21
The response against which the Chief Justice's final hope is expressed
is not wholly imaginary. At least one publicist has come forward with
cannot be left to the courts alone. Judge Ketcham of the Juvenile Court in the District
of Columbia has eloquently pointed out that all persons "interested in justice for children
as well as concerned with their social welfare" [and what responsible citizen can fail to
be?] must insist on improvement in the juvenile courts and on the provision of facilities
suitable to the effectuation of their purposes. The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile
Court 7 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 97 (1961).
18. Milton Luger, quoted in THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 26, 1970, at 17.
19. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970).
20. A somewhat similar thought was expressed by Justice Weintraub concurring in
In re State in Interest of Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110, 121 (1966) where he said,
With respect to crime, we suppress the truth even if it means the release of one who
is plainly guilty, and this in the belief that the support thereby given a constitutional
value outweighs the price tomorrow's victims may pay. I would suggest that it need
not follow that the same course should be pursued with respect to juvenile de-
linquency, since as to it there is another value to be weighed, to wit, the rehabilita-
tion- of the infant. To deny an infant the attention he needs because the police erred
in obtaining evidence of that need may not be the parental thing to do. Id. at 122.
This plainly should not be read. as suggesting either that rehabilitation. of "criminals"
is not a value to be weighed, or that juveniles should be rehabilitated even if there is no
acceptable evidence of need to do so. But the former proposition often seems to underlie
discussions of juvenile law; and too many juvenile court determinations seem to embody
the latter.
21. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 376 (1970).
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the thought that the logical path initiated by Gault would lead to re-
turning truly criminal juveniles to the criminal courts-"A return to
old time justice. '22 It cannot be assumed that this idea would be de-
void of appeal to at least some legislators; but it can be suggested,
with respect, that "rigors and trauma" may inhere more in determina-
tions of delinquency based on constitutionally unacceptable procedures
than in subjecting the juvenile to processing in a court limited by
some, if not all,23 of the traditional constitutional protections. This
will be the more true if the effect of the determination is to send the
delinquent to a "rehabilitative" facility which differs in no substantial
respect from a jail.
Here we return to the issue dealt with in this paper: The concern
(vel non) of the juvenile courts with the rehabilitative facilities to
which their determinations relegate the young. It must be conceded
at the outset that the authorities on this question are at best sparse
and equivocal. Their sparsity may, perhaps, be attributed to the un-
doubted fact that, at least until very recently, juveniles have seldom
had the advice of counsel; but the equivocality probably indicates
that the thesis of this paper, as states above, has not appealed strongly
to even those courts before which it has come.
An early case raised-and disposed of-the issue with rare clarity.
State v. Ragan24 held in 1910 that no adequate challenge to the juve-
nile court's jurisdiction was presented by the claim that Louisiana had
no facilities appropriate to the treatment of juveniles. State ex rel.
Sowders v. Superior Ct.,25 in similar vein simply denied judicial con-
trol over the allegedly unacceptable character of the available deten-
tion facility (jail) in Washington. Two more recent cases avoid
bringing the courts face to face with the question of suitability of
facilities. Carter v. Montoya28 vacated a citation of contempt issued by
a juvenile judge against the superintendent of a hospital and training
school who had refused to take in a committed juvenile; and the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Wiggins27 satisfied itself by calling
22. Parker, Instant Maturation for the Post Gault "Hood", 4 FAMILY L.Q. 113, 127
(1970).
23. The Supreme Court has so far been explicit in denying that it has imposed on the
juvenile courts all of the limitations affecting criminal courts. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
at 359 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 51 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 562(1966).
24. 125 La. 121, 51 So. 89 (1910).
25. 105 Wash. 684, 179 P. 79 (1919).
26. 75 N.M. 730, 410 P.2d 951 (1966).
27. 425 P.2d 1004 (OkL 1967).
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the inadequacy of challenged facilites to the attention of administra-
tive authorities and hoping for the best. It may be surmised that the
inadequacy of available facilities was of some effect in persuading the
North Dakota Supreme Court to extricate a delinquent girl from an
otherwise apparently hopeless tangle of bureaucratic "rehabilitation." 2s
Nevertheless, no one of these cases suggests that the inadequacy of fa-
cilities might abrogate the power of the court to send children to them
for rehabilitation.
A group of cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia may point in a different direction. Fol-
lowing an initial decision in which juvenile law was not involved,29
that court proceeded to construe the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court Act as requiring, in effect, that detention facilities be appropri-
ate to their stated purpose.30 The first case was admittedly an elaborate
dictum, giving warning as to proposed future holdings.31 This was
followed soon by In re Elmore32 which required the juvenile court to
look into the claim that the detention facility lacked means to give
needed psychiatric care to a detained child. It thus applied the dictum
of the previous case that the District of Columbia statute confers "a
legal right to custody that is not inconsistent with the parens patriae
premise of the law."133 Since, moreov er, the "parens patriae premise"
has so frequently been made the foundation for the constitutionality
of the whole juvenile process, it does not require a great stretch of the
imagination to believe that this court might have found a constitu-
28. In re Braun 145 N.W.2d 482 (N.D. 1966). A brief summary of the facts is the
following: Jeanette Braun, aged sixteen, was found delinquent for rather minor mis-
conduct in school and was remanded to her parents on probation, a condition of which
was that she continue in school. She failed of admission and was brought back to the
court, at which time it developed that she was pregnant and planned to marry. She was
forthwith committed to an "industrial school" which had no facilities to care for pregnant
girls and which sent her to a Florence Crittenden Home. While at the latter she married
the father of the unborn child (a ceremony which her own father attended) and left the
Florence Crittenden Home, which would not keep married women. Jeanette's marriage
was annulled because she had not obtained the statutorily required approval to marry
from the industrial school or the Juvenile Court; and her commitment to the industrial
school was continued by the juvenile court's refusal of a motion for new trial or rehearing
which motion set out the urgent desire of herself, her parents and the father of her
child to get her married and settled down in circumstances which, as alleged, seemed
eminently satisfactory. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of her motion, directed
termination of her commitment and the granting of permission to marry.
29. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) released an elderly woman from
confinement where there were no facilities to treat the mental illness upon which the
confinement was predicated. Compare, Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
30. See, Kittrie, supra note 3, and Cohen, Right of the Civil and Criminally Incar.
cerated, 4 CLaARINc HousE RavIEW 399 (1971).
31. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
32. App. D.C. 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
33. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 111 (1967).
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tional basis for the declared right had the statute not provided it; but
no subsequent case has had occasion to speak to that proposition.3 4
It is difficult to say what the precise effect was of the denouement 5 of
the protracted litigation over Kent. It was finally held that the (retro-
active) waiver and transfer of an insane juvenile for trial as an adult
criminal was an improper dispositive order, the outcome being that
Kent was held pending proceedings for civil commitment.3 6
New York has also produced a number of cases which may be attri-
buted to its unique statutory scheme. In re Ronny37 holds that a child
may not be institutionalized for a delinquent act unless there appears
need for his rehabilitation by such means. In re Anonymous 5 involved
a situation in which the training school to which the child had been
sent had concluded no rehabilitation could be effected by available
facilities. The court was impelled to release her from further deten-
tion. 9
Another group of cases may be thought to have no relevance to the
instant discussion, but the fact that the Supreme Court has referred
specifically to the problem they present may make them significant.
In discussing Gault's disadvantages as a juvenile, the court pointed
out:
If Gerald had been over 18, he would not have been subject
to Juvenile Court proceedings.. For the particular offense imme-
diately involved, the maximum punishment would have been a
fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than two
months. Instead, he was committed to custody for a maximum of
six years. 40
34. Cf. Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Haziel v. United States, 404
F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
35. Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968), Burger, J., dissenting; Com-
pare, Rouse v. Cameron, 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
36. Somewhat similar in effect are Interest of Winburn 32 Wisc. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d
178 (1966) directing discharge of an insane juvenile and Harryford v. Parker 396 F.2d 393
(10th Cir. 1968), disapproving commitment of a feeble-minded epileptic. Compare Pel-
letier v. Langlois, 94 R.I. 262, 179 A.2d 856 (1962), which refuses to sanction the jailing
of a "defective delinquent."
37. 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1963).
38. 43 Misc. 2d 213, 250 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1964). Compare the excellent discussion, In re
Mario, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1971).
39. There are, of course, numerous cases in which an appellate court reverses on the
ground that the lower court's invocation of the power to commit is simply an error of
law. State v. Pulakis, 14 Wash. 2d 507, 128 P.2d 649 (1942) and State ex rel. Marcum v.
Ferrell, 140 W. Va. 202, 83 S.E.2d 648 (1954) are two rather striking examples. In Pulakis
a juvenile was sent to training school because it would do him good although he was not
shown to have been delinquent. In Marcum, a girl was sent to a juvenile facility because
she was a somewhat recalcitrant witness in a rape case. Both appellate courts reversed.
See also, Matter of Hamill, 271 A.2d 762 (Md., 1970).
40. In re Gault, supra note 5 at 29.
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This language plainly does not import approval of Gerald's situation,
yet it is difficult accurately to characterize the unfavorable inference.
The indeterminate sentence was eagerly sought by the criminal reform
movement of the nineteenth century. This is not an appropriate place
to trace its history or review its recommendations; 41 but it can be noted
that a basic virtue attributed to it was its flexibility. This made it
adaptable to rehabilitative programs since a sentence need last only so
long as it took to accomplish their purpose. Generally, such sentences
cannot last longer than the maximum terms applicable to the crime.
However this may have worked out in the development of adult crimi-
nal law, there is no doubt that it was seized on by the architects of the
juvenile court system where it very frequently serves to lengthen the
period (if any) which would be applied as a criminal sentence for the
act in question. This device became almost as closely identified with
the rehabilitative pretensions of this system as the notion of parens
patriae itself.
Indeed, it has been held in some jurisductions that definite term
sentences are impermissible. 42 From early times challenges to the
results of the device have failed. In 1911, North Carolina saw no infir-
mity in a sentence which could keep a juvenile incarcerated for as
long as six years for an offence (vagrancy) which could hold an adult
for no more than 30 days. 43 South Carolina was equally unimpressed
by the argument against a sentence with a potential of holding juve-
niles eight and ten years of age until their respective majorities for
what would impose a maximum of ten days on an adult. It saw no
deprivation of rights of the juveniles involved, or of those of their
parents.44 Missouri has held similarly,45 and no state appellate court
has been found which has held to the contrary.46
Two recent cases may augur change, however. Commonwealth v.
Daniels47 held unconstitutional as denying equal protection a statute
authorizing the imposition of indeterminate sentences on women for
41. See, Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW AND CONTFEMP.
PROB. 528 (1958).
42. Cohen v. Clark, 107 Neb. 849, 187 N.W. 120 (1922), followed in In re Roth 158
Neb. 789, 64 N.W.2d 799 (1954). It has also been held that once a juvenile is committed
to the rehabilitative system provided by statute, the juvenile court loses power to inter-
vene. State v. Shrode, 119 Ind. App. 57, 83 N.E.2d 900 (1949).
43. Ex parte Watson, 157 N.C. 340, 72 S.E. 1049 (1911).
44. State v. Cagle, 111 S.C. 548, 96 S.E. 291 (1918).
45. Ex Parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931).
46. Cf., Interest of K.V.N., 112 N.J. Super. 544, 271 A.2d 921 (1970); Sas v. Maryland,
334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
47. 430 Pa. 642, 243 A2d 400 (1968); accord, U.S. ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp.
8 (D.C.D. Conn. 1968).
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an offense which authorized a sentence on males which could be fixed
within definite limits (less than the maximum to which the indeter-
minate one might run). Of course, it is still possible to argue that,
while there is no reasonable ground for classifying women as differing
from men in this context, the rehabilitation of youth is a wholly diff-
erent matter from the sentencing of adults48-male or female. This
position appears less than satisfying.
One other case may bear mention here, although it is apparently
sui generis. In Workman v. Commonwealth49 two fourteen year old
boys were convicted, after waiver and transfer to criminal court, of
a particularly unpleasant, forcible rape. They were sentenced to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole under a statute authorizing
that sentence for the crime charged. It was held on appeal that the
denial of possible parole was unconstitutional, the court regarding
this part of the sentence as "cruel and unusual" under the Federal,
and "cruel" under the State, constitution. The majority of the court
felt that the youth of the defendants was incompatible with the implied
judgment that they could never be rehabilitated. It made clear its
belief that the statutory sentence could, constitutionally have been
applied to an adult. This case on its facts obviously has no direct
bearing on the imposition by juvenile courts of indeterminate sen-
tences which may extend beyond a period reasonably appropriate for
rehabilitation,50 but it finds a specific constitutional prohibition
against imposing on youth a detention which presupposes-and creates
-impossibility of rehabilitation. 51 Another specific constitutional right
juveniles have been accorded is not to be incarcerated in racially
segregated facilities. 52
The District of Columbia has again taken the lead in a series of
cases which strikes closest to the heart of the issue here examined. In
White v. Reid53 the District Court had before it a challenge by a juve-
nile delinquent to his commitment to an institution established by
Federal law for the rehabilitation of "youthful offenders" who were
48. But see, In re Wilson, 246 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1971).
49. 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968). Compare, Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970).
50. Compare, In re Smigelski 185 F. Supp. 283 (D.C.N.J. 1960) with AppI. of Johnson
178 F. Supp. 155 (D.C.N.J. 1957), the former disagreeing with the latter's holding that
detaining a delinquent, who had been first committed as a juvenile, until well beyond
adulthood was improper because all possibility of rehabilitation had expired.
51. Compare, Interest of Steenback 34 N.J. 89, 167 A.2d 397 (1961).
52. Singleton v. Board 356 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1966); Crum v. State Training School
for Girls 413 F.2d 1348 (C.A. 5, Ala., 1969).
53. 126 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1954).
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regularly convicted of crime but thought to be amenable to rehabili-
tation. The Court examined into the character of the facilities and
compared them, not unfavorably, with those assigned to juveniles
committed under the separate Federal statute establishing the District
of Columbia Juvenile Court. It nevertheless said after discussing the
relevant statutes:
The Court, accordingly, concludes that both Constitution and
statute forbid the transfer of a youth committed under the Juve-
nile Court Act to any institution designed for custody of persons
convicted of crimes . . . and the commingling of such juveniles
with criminals. 4
This decision was followed in United States v. Hegstrom;5 5 and
Kautter v. Reid56 extended it slightly to forbid even the temporary
detention of a juvenile parole violator in the District of Columbia
jail. Later Judge Ketcham reviewed a closely similar case of transfer
from a juvenile facility to the one dealt with in Reid.57 He observed:
If, after such a juvenile proceeding, the juvenile can, by the dis-
cretionary act of an executive officer, be transferred to a place
of penal servitude, the entire claim of parens patriae becomes a
hypocritical mockery. In such circumstances, those interested in
the welfare of children might better urge the abolition of the
Juvenile Court than seek its improvement."8
Some State cases are similarly oriented. In re Rich59 directed the re-
lease of a recalcitrant juvenile from the penal institution to which
he had been sent and his re-transfer to the juvenile facility. It stated:
The validity of the whole juvenile system is dependent upon
its adherence to its protective rather than its penal aspects. In re
Gomez, supra, 113 Vt. 224, 225, 32 A.2d 138.
State e.r. Londeholm v. Owens,60 held unconstitutional a statute
specifically authorizing the use of a reformatory for the commitment
of boys over sixteen despite a vigorous dissent which asserted that the
only other available facilities were, and the legislature must have
54. Id. at 871.
55. 178 F. Supp. 17 (D.C. Conn. 1959).
56. 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960).
57. Matter of Eleven D.C. Youths, 91 Wash. Law Reporter 3009 (Juvenile Court,
District of Columbia, 1963).
58. Id. at 3010; see Pirsig, The Constitutional Validity of Confining Disruptive
Delinquents in Penal Institutions, 54 MINN. L. REv. 101 (1969).
59. 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1965).
60. 197 Kan. 212, 416 P.2d 259 (1966).
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known them to be, wholly inadequate in size for the predictable popu-
lation of delinquents. New York, under its unique system, forbids
the sending of its category, "persons in need of supervision," a milder
group than delinquents, to a reformatory.61
Two other State cases reaching the opposite conclusion evoked
vigorous dissents. It is interesting to note the contrasting viewpoints.
The majority of the Iowa Supreme Court justifies the incarceration:
In making this transfer the board is presumed to be performing
a duty imposed upon it, that of restraint, education and reforma-
tion. It is not restraining the natural liberty of the child, but is
placing him under a natural restraint, a restraint so far as is prac-
ticable as should be exercised by a parent . . .,. While we may not
feel restraint in a place generally used and occupied by convicted
felons is quite proper for a child of 16 years, yet this seems to be
a policy question for the legislature, not the courts. 62
And the dissent:
No one would contend that the juvenile court could, under our
present law, find a juvenile delinquent and commit him to the
Anamosa Reformatory without offering opportunity for a jury
trial. Can the state, in the name of administrative efficiency do
indirectly what it cannot, in the name of law enforcement, do
directly?63
People ex rel. Rodello v. Denver District Court" shows the Colorado
court rather differently divided. The dissent in that case seems to say
that juvenile detention facilities are in fact jails and therefore, a seven-
teen year old should be tried criminally without reference to the
juvenile court for transfer.
Shone v. State,65 however, simply regards inter-institutional trans-
fers of recalcitrant juveniles as an administrative matter not raising
a serious constitutional issue; and Shone v. Maine66 agrees on the
basis of the weight of state and lower federal authority.67 Rhode
61. In re Anonymous, 20 App. Div. 395, 247 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1964); Fish v. Horn, 14
N.Y.2d 905, 200 N.E.2d 857, 252 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1964). But cf., In re Mario, 317 N.Y.S.2d
659 (1971).
62. Wilson v. Coughlin, 259 Iowa 1163, 147 N.W.2d 175, 179-80 (1966).
63. Id. at 183.
64. 164 Colo. 530, 436 P.2d 672 (1968).
65. 237 A.2d 412 (Me. 1968).
66. 286 F. Supp. 511 (D.C. Me. 1968).
67. The statement as to weight of authority is substantially correct although much of
that cited precedes cases cited above which might well have influenced it, and some
seems, with respect, not wholly apposite.
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Island 8 and Pennsylvania69 appear to agree with Maine, while the
latest decision in Connecticut is neutral in effect.70
CONCLUSION
Suppose there is taken as a text the composite quotation 7 found
in In re Urbasek72
A minor found guilty of the requisite conduct to be adjudged
a delinquent "is committed to an institution where he may be re-
strained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence
-and of limited practical meaning-that the institution to which
he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the
matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home"
or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of con-
finement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser
time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls,
regimented routine and institutional laws. . . ." Instead of mother
and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates,
his world is peopled by guards, custodians [and] state employees."
When we eschew legal fictions and adopt a realistic view of the
consequences that attach to a determination of delinquency and
a commitment to a juvenile detention home "juvenile quarters"
in a jail, or a state institution . . . we can neither truthfully nor
fairly say that such an institution is devoid of penal characteristics.
Urbasek used this depressing assessment to support its adding an-
other dollop of due process to juvenile delinquency hearings.73 It may
equally well, however, serve here as the basis for our inquiry: can the
courts control the character of the facilities to which they are com-
mitting youngsters? They can if they choose, of course, say that this
is a matter for legislative policy makers and not a concern of the courts.
They can in many jurisdictions point to specific legislation which
places the responsibility for such matters in other hands. But if these
68. The only direct holding appears to be Long v. Langlois 93 R.I. 23, 170 A.2d 618(1961). The later case where the issue was raised dismissed the matter as moot. Cochrane
v. Langlois, 247 A.2d 91 (R.I. 1968). A different view may result from In re Brown 4 Cr. L.
Rep. 2203 (1968).
69. Matter of John Williams, 210 Pa. Super 388, 234 A.2d 37 (1917): In re Jones, 432
Pa. 44, 246 A.2d 346 (1968).
70. Appeal of Bailey, 158 Conn. 439, 262 A.2d 177 (1969) simply found a failure of
proof as to the criminal character of the challenged institution.
71. The contributors are Gault, dissent in Holmes' Appeal and the Illinois Court
itself.
72. 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 at 719 (1967).
73. It was. an early case in the Winship category, requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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easy evasions do not appeal, could they find authority for the position
that their specially conferred jurisdiction does not permit them to
abuse children by sending them for rehabilitation to institutions which
can only, and do consistently, corrupt? It is submitted that they could
-and should.
The District of Columbia courts inquire into--and, presumably,
assert the right to take remedial action respecting-absence of facilities
for needed psychiatric care in the local juvenile detention quarters.
New York releases juveniles where institutionalizing them promises
no rehabilitation. The courts may annul dispositions on specific con-
stitutional grounds stemming from the fact that they do not meet
a need for rehabilitation or that the facility itself imposes forbidden
racial segregation. Finally, the courts may reverse orders to incarcerate
juveniles in facilities that are proven to be "criminal" or "penal" in
character.
Concededly, none of these powers has attracted unanimous support.
Such support as is shown for them above, however, surely suggests that
their existence cannot be flatly denied. An analysis of them would
seem ample to warrant a juvenile court's insistence that the effectua-
tion of its dispositions be made to comport with the basis upon which
their constitutional validity rests, the alternative being the refusal
to exercise its special jurisdiction. The near unanimity attracted by
the view that the promise of the juvenile court system is not being re-
alized should be challenge enough to lead the courts to seek and im-
pose such a solution.
ENVOI
[I]t is hard to explain away the experience in California where
a judge closed a juvenile institution because he was disgusted with
the absence of sound treatment. The children had been neglected
and abused in the institution. Most were simply sent home by thejudge, some were placed in foster homes. The police predicted a
crime wave; it never came. Six months later, out of 140 children
taken out of the institution, only ten were in trouble again.7 4
74. SOL RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY at 40, (3d ed. 1970).
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